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Minnesota v. Dickerson
SUPREME COURT
CREA TED
"PLAIN FEEL"
EXCEPTION TO
THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court in Minne-
sota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130
(1993), recognized a "plain feel"
exception to the warrant requirement
but held that the officer's search and
seizure in the instant case did not
come under this new exception and
unconstitutionally invaded the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court increased the
police authority created in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968) to conduct
limited, warrantless searches based
on articulable suspicion and extended
the plain view theory to include items
found by touch. Under the rule of
Minnesota v. Dickerson, if a police
officer discovers drugs or other con-
traband during a lawful patdown, the
officer may seize those items without
a warrant.
On November 9, 1989, while on
evening patrol, two Minneapolis po-
lice officers developed reasonable
suspicion to stop Dickerson. The
officers saw him leave a notorious
"crack house," abruptly change di-
rection, and enter a nearby alley after
making eye contact with the police.
The officers stopped Dickerson and
frisked him for weapons. Although
no weapons were found, one of the
officers felt a lump in Dickerson's
front pocket and discovered that it
was crack cocaine. Dickerson was
charged with possession, found guilty
and sentenced to two years probation.
The trial court, in denying
Dickerson's motion to suppress, first
concluded that the officers were justi-
fied in stopping and frisking him un-
der Terry. Second, the court stated
that under the plain view theory of
warrantless seizures, it made no dif-
ference which sensory perception was
employed by the officer to "view" the
cocaine, so the evidence was deemed
admissible. Dickerson was subse-
quently convicted on the theory that a
seizure based on "plain feel" does not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed
the conviction by refusing to accept
the "plain feel" theory and finding
that the officer violated Dickerson's
Fourth Amendment rights. In reject-
ing the trial court's rationale that there
is no difference between the senses,
and affirming the decision of the
intermediate appellate court, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court foundthattouch
is more intrusive of protected Fourth
Amendment rights than is sight. Thus,
the court concluded that, as a rule,
contraband may not be seized during
a patdown. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari "to
resolve the conflict among the state
and federal courts over whether con-
traband detected through the sense of
touch during a patdown search may
be admitted into evidence."
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134.
While affirming the decision of
the state's highest court, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the
"categorical rule barring the seizure
of any contraband detected by an of-
ficer through the sense of touch ...."
1d. Justice White, writing for a unani-
mous Court, reviewed earlier deci-
sions which created the major excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement. In Terry v. Ohio,
392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court held that
where an officer had an articulable
suspicion that criminal activities were
occurring, he could lawfully stop a
person to make inquiries. If the offi-
cer believed that the suspect was dan-
gerous, he could conduct a limited
search. This type of search isjustified
by the need to protect the officer and
the public from harm. The Court in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), extended this theory to allow
an officer to conduct a limited protec-
tive search not only of the suspect, but
also of the interior of a lawfully de-
tained car. Additionally, the Court
noted that while conducting a search
of the passenger compartment of the
vehicle where weapons may be hid-
den, the officer may seize contraband
which is in plain view. The Court
summarized the law by stating that in
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certain circumstances where an offi-
cer had a lawful reason and right of
access to search a person or his ve-
hicle, items in plain view whose "in-
criminating character is immediately
apparent .... may be seized without a
warrant. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at
2136-37. The Court explained the
rationale for the plain view exception
by noting that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding ob-
jects open to public view. Therefore,
there may be no unreasonable search
or seizure which violates the Fourth
Amendment in those situations.
The Court applied the plain
view doctrine and its rationale by
analogy to searches involving the sense
of touch and specifically rejected the
ruleof the Minnesota Supreme Court.
First, the Court held that, as demon-
strated in Terry, "the sense of touch
is capable of revealing the nature of
an object with sufficient reliability to
support a seizure." Id. at 2137. In
both cases, Fourth Amendment rights
are protected by requiring articulable
suspicion before the search is con-
ducted. Second, the Court found that
the proposition that touch is more
intrusive than the other senses is inap-
posite, as a patdown for weapons is
already justified. Id. at 2138.
Upon analyzing the facts of the
case to determine whether the police
officer had acted within Terry when
searching the lump in Dickerson's
jacket, the Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Minnesota Su-
preme Court that the officer had un-
constitutionally invaded Dickerson's
privacy. Id. The Court upheld the
state supreme court's interpretation
that the officer's excessive probing
into the defendant's pocket after it
was apparent that the pocket did not
contain a weapon, "overstepped the
bounds of the 'strictly circumscribed'
search for weapons allowed under
Terry." Id. (citing Terryv. Ohio, 392
U. S. at 26). Referring to Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987), in which
the Court held that moving an item to
read its serial numbers and thereby
develop probable cause to believe that
the item was stolen went beyond the
plain view exception, the Court stated
that where the incriminating charac-
ter of an item is not immediately ap-
parent, a further search is unconstitu-
tional. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2139.
The Supreme Court concluded that
since the officer in Dickerson discov-
ered that the item in the defendant's
pocket was cocaine only after closely
examining it with his fingers, such
action constituted further search and
seizure and was constitutionally in-
valid. Id.
Although the officer's actions
in Minnesota v. Dickerson were
found to be unconstitutional, the Su-
preme Court recognized that seizing
drugs or other contraband as a result
of a lawful patdown may be constitu-
tional in certain circumstances. When
an officer has reasonable suspicion to
stop and to conduct a limited search of
a person, contraband may be seized
when it is within the officer's "plain
feel." The sense of touch in such
situations is equivalent to sight in the
established "plain view" exception
to the warrant requirement. Until
Dickerson, Maryland law allowed for
the seizure of only weapons, not con-
traband, as the result of a lawfil
patdown. In light of the Court's land-
mark decision in Dickerson, the power
of police officers in Maryland has
been significantly increased while the
privacy interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment have become
alarmingly limited.
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